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Abstract
A small probability space representation of quantum mechanical
probabilities is defined as a collection of Kolmogorovian probability
spaces, each of which is associated with a context of a maximal set of
compatible measurements, that portrays quantum probabilities as Kol-
mogorovian probabilities of classical events. Bell’s theorem is stated
and analyzed in terms of the small probability space formalism.
1
1 Introduction
There are two remarkably different ways in which Bell’s inequalities can be
obtained. Following Bell’s original reasoning, the standard approach is to de-
rive Bell’s inequalities from the requirement of a common causal explanation
for a certain set of events and their probabilities (Bell 1964, 1975; Clauser
and Shimony 1978; Hofer-Szabó, Rédei and Szabó 2013, Ch. 9).1 The other
approach, based on the results of Pitowsky and Fine, does not invoke causal
notions but derives Bell’s inequalities from the requirement of a certain set of
probability-like numbers being representable in a Kolmogorovian probability
space (Fine 1982a, 1982b, Accardi 1984; Pitowsky 1989).
Bell’s inequalities are famously violated by a certain set of quantum me-
chanical probabilities that have been measured and confirmed in various ex-
periments. The standard approach and the Pitowsky–Fine approach differ
remarkably in what this fact is taken to express. According to the standard
approach the violation of Bell’s inequalities implies that there is no common
causal explanation (of the required sort) for events described by the quan-
tum mechanical probabilities in question. According to the Pitowsky–Fine
approach the violation of Bell’s inequalities implies that there are no events
representable in a Kolmogorovian probability space whose probabilities would
be equal to the quantum mechanical probabilities in question.
There is an apparent tension between these two conclusions. If, according
to the Pitowsky–Fine approach, there are no events representable in a Kol-
mogorovian probability space whose probabilities are equal to the quantum
mechanical probabilities in question, then what sort of events and what sort
of probabilities attached to them are required to be explainable in terms of
common causes along the lines of the standard approach? Before answering
this question the standard version of Bell’s theorem cannot be meaningfully
formulated.
This point was first raised by Szabó (1995). His reading of the violation of
Bell’s inequalities à la Pitowsky–Fine is that there cannot exist events in the
1Bell’s original 1964 derivation proceeds in two steps: first, he refers to the EPR
argument as an implication from certain predictions of quantum mechanics to deterministic
hidden variables, and second, he shows that deterministic hidden variables imply the Bell
inequalities. Despite appearances, as is argued by Gömöri and Hofer-Szabó (2017), the
EPR argument is essentially the expression of the need for a common casual explanation
for the EPR correlations with EPR’s famous Criterion of Reality being a special case of
the Common Cause Principle.
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world whose probabilities are equal to the quantum mechanical probabilities
in question. However, there is a sense in which quantum probabilities reflect
the probabilities of real events: Szabó’s proposal is that quantum probabil-
ities are conditional in nature. That is, whenever we say 〈ψ, PAψ〉 we do
not refer to a probability p (A) of an event A, but rather to a conditional
probability p (A | a) , which is to be read as the probability of a measurement
outcome A given that the corresponding measurement a has been performed.
This understanding of quantum mechanical probabilities is in harmony with
the laboratory practice of testing the predictions of quantum mechanics.
In accordance with this interpretation, Szabó proves that there exists a
large Kolmogorovian probability space Σ in which the quantum mechanical
probabilities that violate Bell’s inequalities can be represented as conditional
probabilities. This space is large insofar as it not only contains events repre-
senting outcomes of measurements but also events representing measurement
settings. It is in terms of this probability space Σ that the requirement of
common casual explanation can be meaningfully formulated and the standard
version of Bell’s theorem can be stated. For, according to Szabó’s proposal,
the events and probabilities to be explained reside in probability space Σ.
In the present paper we suggest a slightly different framework for the
formulation of Bell’s theorem. The philosophy is taken from Szabó: quan-
tum probabilities are not absolute probabilities but probabilities relativized
to different measurements. However, instead of starting out from one large
probability space Σ we shall use a collection of small probability spaces {Σi}
each of which is associated with a certain measurement context. The moti-
vation for this is the following. The large probability space Σ includes the
measurement settings and their probabilities. These data may vary from ex-
periment to experiment, so we have a different Σ space for each instance of
the kind of experiment in question. What all these different Σ spaces will
agree on—and this has been confirmed in experiments of diverse sort—are
the conditional probabilities representing the quantum mechanical probabil-
ities. It is thus reasonable to see those conditional probabilities, the robust
part of the data, as encoding inherent physical properties of the system in
question, as opposed to the probabilities of measurement settings, the vary-
ing part of the data, determined by conditions coming from outside of the
system, for example by the experimenter’s decisions. In this sense the proba-
bilities of measurement settings correspond to an “excess structure” of Σ that
is not inherent to quantum mechanical phenomena and that we do not ex-
pect to be accounted for by our common causal explanation. It is when this
3
sort of excess structure is factored out from Szabó’s large probability space
that we arrive at the small probability space models of quantum mechanical
probabilities.2
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the pre-
cise definitions of representations of quantum probabilities in large versus
small probability spaces and investigate their relationship. In Section 3 we
construct the representation of quantum probabilities associated with the
Bell–Aspect experiment in small probability spaces. To our knowledge, this
has never been explicitly done in the literature (although the topic of large
versus small probability spaces for quantum experiments has been discussed,
see Svetlichny et al. 1988; Müller and Placek 2001; Fine 1982a, 1982b). In
Section 4 we characterize the requirement of common causal explanation as
the existence of a hidden variable model consisting of a further collection of
small probability spaces. We will describe these spaces for the Bell–Aspect
experiment. Finally, in Section 5 we formulate the standard version of Bell’s
theorem and connect it with the Pitowsky–Fine version in terms of small
probability spaces. More specifically, we demonstrate that the three stan-
dard premises of Bell’s theorem, Parameter Independence (PI), Outcome
Independence (OI), and No Conspiracy (NOCONS), permit one to paste to-
gether the small probability spaces representing the Bell–Aspect experiment
into one Kolmogorovian probability space, a Kolmogorovian probability rep-
resentation of this experiment in the original sense of Pitowsky–Fine. Since
the latter is not to be had (because of the violation of Bell’s inequalities and
Pitowsky’s theorem), OI, PI, and NOCONS cannot be jointly true.
2 Representing quantum probabilities
Definition 1. A quantum mechanical experiment is a triple 〈H, ψ,On〉 where
H is a Hilbert space, ψ ∈ H is a unit vector, and On = {P1, ..., Pn} is a set
of n projection operators on H.3
A quantum mechanical experiment represents a finite collection of “yes/no”
type quantum mechanical measurements performed in a given quantum state.
2Note that this kind of factorization by no means involves assumption about the au-
tonomy of measurement choice in the sense of no-conspiracy. This assumption will be
expressed in terms of the small probability space models in Section 4.
3This definition is taken from Feintzeig 2014.
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By “quantum probabilities” we mean the numbers delivered by the quantum
mechanical statistical algorithm:
pi = 〈ψ, Piψ〉
and
pij...k = 〈ψ, PiPj...Pkψ〉
whenever Pi, Pj, ..., Pk pairwise commute. Such a data set of quantum prob-
abilities 〈p1, ..., pn, ..., pij...k, ...〉 will be referred to as the correlation vector
associated with the quantum mechanical experiment 〈H, ψ,On〉 in question.
A correlation vector associated with a quantum mechanical experiment
consists of probability-like numbers. But are they really probabilities? Are
there events in the world whose probabilities are equal to quantum probabil-
ities? More precisely, are there events occurring in the runs of a real-world
experiment whose relative frequencies are equal to quantum probabilities?
A minimal condition for this to be the case is that one has to be able to
construct a Kolmogorovian probability space in which those events and their
probabilities are accommodated.4
Definition 2. A Kolmogorovian representation of a quantum mechanical
experiment 〈H, ψ,On〉 is a Kolmogorovian probability space 〈Ω,F , p〉 that
satisfies the following conditions:
• to each Pi ∈ On there corresponds an A˜i ∈ F such that
p
(
A˜i
)
= 〈ψ, Piψ〉 (1)
• for all Pi, Pj..., Pk ∈ On, if they pairwise commute, then
p
(
A˜i ∩ A˜j ∩ ... ∩ A˜k
)
= 〈ψ, PiPj...Pkψ〉 (2)
As we know from Pitowsky (1989), a quantum mechanical experiment whose
associated correlation vector violates the appropriate Bell-type inequalities
does not have a Kolmogorovian representation. The correlation vector
〈p1, p2, p3, p4, p13, p14, p23, p24〉 =
〈
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
3
8
,
3
8
, 0,
3
8
〉
(3)
associated with the Bell–Aspect experiment does violate the appropriate Bell-
type inequalities. Consequently:
4For more on this point see Szabó’s (2001) Laboratory Record Argument.
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Theorem 1. There is a quantum mechanical experiment with no Kolmogoro-
vian representation.
Thus, quantum probabilities are not Kolmogorovian in general. If not Kol-
mogorovian, then what sort of probabilities are they?
According to Szabó’s (1995, 2001) proposal quantum probabilities are
Kolmogorovian conditional probabilities.
Definition 3. A large conditional Kolmogorovian representation of a quan-
tum mechanical experiment 〈H, ψ,On〉 is a Kolmorogovian probability space
〈Ω,F , p〉 that satisfies the following conditions:
• to each Pi ∈ On there corresponds two events Ai, ai ∈ F , Ai ⊂ ai such
that
p (Ai | ai) = 〈ψ, Piψ〉 (4)
• for all Pi, Pj ∈ On, if they do not commute, then ai ∩ aj = ∅
• for all Pi, Pj..., Pk ∈ On, if they pairwise commute, then
p (ai ∩ aj ∩ ... ∩ ak) > 0 and
p
(
A±i ∩ A±j ∩ ... ∩ A±k | ai ∩ aj ∩ ... ∩ ak
)
=
〈
ψ, P±i P
±
j ...P
±
k ψ
〉
(5)
where A+i = Ai, A
−
i = ai \Ai, P+i = Pi, P−i = P⊥i ; P⊥i is the orthogonal
complement of Pi.
Here ai is to be read as the event of setting up a measurement device to
perform a certain “yes/no” type measurement, and Ai as the event of the
firing of the corresponding “yes” detector. The “incompatibility” of two mea-
surements is coded in the postulate that the corresponding two measurement
settings are disjoint.
Since the large probability space 〈Ω,F , p〉 is Kolmogorovian, the proba-
bilities of events in it can be interpreted as relative frequencies measured in
a real-world experiment. In contrast, the values of conditional probabilities
(4)–(5) that stand for the quantum mechanical probabilities may well turn
out not to have a Kolmogorovian representation since they are conditional
probabilities with conditioning on different events (as opposed to condition-
ing on one single event). The values of conditional probabilities pertaining to
different conditions typically cannot be delivered (as absolute probabilities)
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by a single Kolmogorovian probability measure. This explains why correla-
tion vectors like (3), associated with the Bell–Aspect experiment, do not have
a Kolmogorovian representation. This is because (3) is in fact a collection of
conditional probabilities
〈p (A1 | a1) , p (A2 | a2) , p (A3 | a3) , p (A4 | a4) , p (A1 ∩ A3 | a1 ∩ a3) ,
p (A1 ∩ A4 | a1 ∩ a4) , p (A2 ∩ A3 | a2 ∩ a3) , p (A2 ∩ A4 | a2 ∩ a4)〉
that do not belong to the same condition.
Now we formulate an alternative characterization of the sense in which
quantum probabilities can be regarded as “conditional”.
Definition 4. A small Kolmogorovian representation of a quantum mechan-
ical experiment 〈H, ψ,On〉 is a finite collection of Kolmogorovian probability
spaces {〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉} α∈I that satisfies the following conditions:
• for α 6= β, Ωα ∩ Ωβ = ∅
• to each maximal set of pairwise commuting projection operators
O ⊆ On there corresponds a Kolmogorovian probability space
〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉 (α ∈ I) such that 〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉 is a Kolmogorovian repre-
sentation of the quantum mechanical experiment 〈H, ψ,O〉
Here a probability space 〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉 represents the probabilities of measure-
ment outcomes in a certain measurement context. The contexts are provided
by the maximal conjunctions of measurements in the quantum mechanical
experiment in question which are (and a fortiori can be) performed simul-
taneously. In other words, 〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉 encodes the relative frequencies of
outcomes in a real-world experiment over the subensemble of experimental
runs where a given maximal conjunction of measurements is performed.
Although each small probability space 〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉 alone is Kol-
mogorovian, quantum probabilities pertaining to different maximal sets
of compatible measurements reside in different members of the collection
{〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉} α∈I . Probability values belonging to different Kolmogorovian
probability spaces do not make up a Kolmogorovian probability measure in
general. This is another way to see why correlation vectors like (3) do not
have a Kolmogorovian representation. It is because (3) is in fact a collection
of probabilities
〈p1j (A1) , p2j (A2) , pi3 (A3) , pi4 (A4) ,
p13 (A1 ∩ A3) , p14 (A1 ∩ A4) , p23 (A2 ∩ A3) , p24 (A2 ∩ A4)〉
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that come from different probability spaces—labeled by the pairs of compat-
ible measurements (i = 1, 2; j = 3, 4).5
A large conditional Kolmogorovian representation portrays quantum
probabilities as conditional probabilities in a large probability space. A
small Kolmogorovian representation portrays quantum probabilities as ab-
solute probabilities in many small probability spaces. We shall now demon-
strate that large conditional and small Kolmogorovian representations are
mutually translatable, though the translation from many small spaces to one
large space requires some extra data. First we show that there is a natural
translation between large and small Kolmogorovian probability spaces.
Proposition 1. Let 〈Ω,F , p〉 be a Kolmogorovian probability space and
{Ωα}α∈I ⊆ F such that p(Ωα) > 0. Define Fα := {X ⊆ Ωα | X ∈ F}
and pα(X) := p(X | Ωα) for X ∈ Fα. Then {〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉}α∈I is a collection
of Kolmogorovian probability spaces.
Proof. It is immediate to see that Fα is a field of subsets of Ωα. As for the
satisfaction of Kolmogorov’s axioms, clearly pα(Ωα) = 1. For the additivity
axiom, let G be a countable family of pairwise disjoint elements of Fα; then
pα(∪G) = p(∪G | Ωα) = p(∪G ∩ Ωα)/p(Ωα) =
∑
A∈G p(A ∩ Ωα)/p(Ωα) =∑
A∈G p(A | Ωα) =
∑
A∈G pα(A).
Proposition 2. Let {〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉}α∈I be a finite collection of Kolmogorovian
probability spaces and {cα}α∈I a set of positive coefficients that sum up to 1.
Then 〈Ω,F , p〉 is a Kolmogorovian probability space, where
• Ω = ⋃α∈I Ωα
• for E ⊆ Ω, E ∈ F iff E ∩ Ωα ∈ Fα
• for E ∈ F , p(E) = ∑α∈I cα · pα(E ∩ Ωα)
Proof. It is straightforward to see that F is a field, indeed. To check the
axioms, let us calculate first p(Ω) =
∑
α∈I cα·pα(Ω∩Ωα) =
∑
α∈I cα·pα(Ωα) =∑
α∈I cα = 1. Next, let G be a countable family of pairwise disjoint elements
5The idea of small Kolmogorovian representation goes back to Kolmogorov (1933) at
least, who argued that each experimental arrangement generates its own probability space.
Kolmogorov was clear that one should not expect that probabilities of outcomes obtained in
various different experimental arrangements can be represented, as absolute probabilities,
in a single (perhaps huge) probability space (Khrennikov 2010, p. 26).
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of F , p(∪G) = ∑α∈I cα · pα(∪G ∩ Ωα) = ∑α∈I cα · pα(⋃A∈G(A ∩ Ωα)) =∑
α∈I
∑
A∈G cαpα(A ∩ Ωα) =
∑
A∈G
∑
α∈I cαpα(A ∩ Ωα) =
∑
A∈G p(A).
Note that the original (“pα”) probabilities are returned by conditional-
ization: if X belongs to Fα, then pα(X) = p(X|Ωα) = p(X)/p(Ωα) =
cαpα(X)/cα = pα(X).6
This natural translation allows us to construct small Kolmogorovian repre-
sentations from large ones, and vica versa.
Proposition 3. A quantum mechanical experiment has a large conditional
Kolmogorovian representations iff it has a small Kolmogorovian representa-
tion.
Proof. (a) Suppose that 〈Ω,F , p〉 is a large conditional Kolmogorovian rep-
resentation of 〈H, ψ,On〉. Consider the collection of Kolmogorovian prob-
ability spaces {〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉}α∈I constructed from 〈Ω,F , p〉 in Proposition 1
with Ωα = am ∩ an ∩ ... ∩ as. Here, following the notation of Definition 3,
am ∩ an ∩ ... ∩ as corresponds to a maximal conjunction of compatible mea-
surements in 〈H, ψ,On〉 as represented in large conditional Kolmogorovian
representation 〈Ω,F , p〉; α ∈ I runs over the set of all such conjunctions.
Consider a given α ∈ I. Let Oα = {Pm, Pn..., Ps} ⊆ On be the cor-
responding maximal set of commuting projectors. We demonstrate that
〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉 is a Kolmogorovian representation of 〈H, ψ,Oα〉. Let A˜i =
Ai∩Ωα = Ai∩am∩an∩...∩as where Ai ∈ F is the “outcome” set representing
Pi ∈ Oα in 〈Ω,F , p〉. Obviously, A˜i ∈ Fα. The following shows that A˜i is a
representation of Pi in 〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉 in the sense of (1):
pα
(
A˜i
)
= p
(
A˜i | Ωα
)
= p (Ai ∩ Ωα | Ωα)
= p (Ai | ai ∩ aj ∩ ... ∩ ak) ?= p (Ai | ai) = 〈ψ, Piψ〉
Further, let Pi, Pj, ..., Pk ∈ Oα. Then:
pα
(
A˜i ∩ A˜j ∩ ... ∩ A˜k
)
= p
(
A˜i ∩ A˜j ∩ ... ∩ A˜k | Ωα
)
= p (Ai ∩ Aj ∩ ... ∩ Ak ∩ Ωα | Ωα)
= p (Ai ∩ Aj ∩ ... ∩ Ak | am ∩ an ∩ ... ∩ as)
?
= p (Ai ∩ Aj ∩ ... ∩ Ak | ai ∩ aj ∩ ... ∩ ak)
= 〈ψ, PiPj...Pkψ〉
6Thanks to Zalán Gyenis for discussions on this topic.
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that is (2) is also satisfied.
In the equalities with ? we made use of the fact that “the statistics of
outcomes of a given set of measurements is not altered by performing a further
measurement”. This is a consequence of the fact that in a commutative
sublattice of a Hilbert lattice the law of total probability holds. For example,
for all Pi, Pj ∈ Oα:
p (Ai | ai) = 〈ψ, Piψ〉 = 〈ψ, PiPjψ〉+
〈
ψ, PiP
⊥
j ψ
〉
= p (Ai ∩ Aj | ai ∩ aj) + p (Ai ∩ (aj \ Aj) | ai ∩ aj)
= p (Ai | ai ∩ aj)
The derivation is similar for more complex conjunctions of measurements.
(b) Suppose that {〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉}α∈I is a small Kolmogorovian representa-
tion of 〈H, ψ,On〉. Consider the Kolmogorovian probability space 〈Ω,F , p〉
constructed from {〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉}α∈I in Proposition 2 with an arbitrary set of
positive coefficients {cα}α∈I that sum up to 1. We demonstrate that 〈Ω,F , p〉
is a large conditional Kolmogorovian representation of 〈H, ψ,On〉.
First, consider a Pi ∈ On. Let
Ai =
⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Aαi
ai =
⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Ωα
where Aαi ∈ Fα is the representing set of Pi in 〈Ωα,Fα, pα〉. Obviously,
Ai, ai ∈ F . We show that Ai, ai provide a “conditional representation” of Pi
in 〈Ω,F , p〉 in the sense that (4) is satisfied.
p (Ai | ai) = p
( ⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Aαi |
⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Ωα
)
=
p
( ⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Aαi
)
p
( ⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Ωα
)
As for the numerator,
p
( ⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Aαi
)
=
∑
β∈I
cβ · pβ
( ⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Aαi ∩ Ωβ
)
??
=
∑
α:Pi∈Oα
cα · pα (Aαi ) =
( ∑
α:Pi∈Oα
cα
)
· 〈ψ, Piψ〉
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as for the denominator,
p
( ⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Ωα
)
=
∑
β∈I
cβ · pβ
( ⋃
α:Pi∈Oα
Ωα ∩ Ωβ
)
??
=
∑
α:Pi∈Oα
cα · pα (Ωα) =
∑
α:Pi∈Oα
cα
Hence, indeed:
p (Ai | ai) = 〈ψ, Piψ〉
In the equalities with ?? we used that in a small Kolmogorovian representa-
tion the Ωα-s are disjoint.
Second, if Pi, Pj ∈ On do not commute then there is no α ∈ I such that
Pi, Pj ∈ Oα. Since the Ωα-s are disjoint, then indeed ai ∩ aj = ∅ as required
in Definition 3.
Third, suppose that Pi, Pj..., Pk ∈ On pairwise commute. Then there is
an α ∈ I such that Ωα ⊆ ai ∩ aj ∩ ... ∩ ak and hence
p (ai ∩ aj ∩ ... ∩ ak) > p (Ωα) =
∑
β∈I
cβ · pβ (Ωα ∩ Ωβ) = cα · pα (Ωα) = cα > 0
Further, a similar calculation as the single outcome case above yields
p
(
A±i ∩ A±j ∩ ... ∩ A±k | ai ∩ aj ∩ ... ∩ ak
)
=
〈
ψ, P±i P
±
j ...P
±
k ψ
〉
That is, (5) is meaningful and satisfied. Note that in this calculation one has
to make use of the fact that in a Kolmogorovian representation 〈Ω,F , p〉 not
only (2) but also
p
(
A˜±i ∩ A˜±j ∩ ... ∩ A˜±k
)
=
〈
ψ, P±i P
±
j ...P
±
k ψ
〉
holds, where A˜+i = A˜i, A˜
−
i = Ω \ A˜i.
It is a well-known fact of Hilbert space quantum mechanics that a com-
mutative sublattice of a Hilbert lattice is Boolean; further, quantum proba-
bility restricted to a Boolean sublattice forms a Kolmogorovian probability
measure. This implies that a quantum mechanical experiment 〈H, ψ,O〉 in
which all projection operators of O pairwise commute has a Kolmogorovian
representation. This of course remains true when O is a maximal subset of
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pairwise commuting projection operators of a set of projectors On. There-
fore, an arbitrary quantum mechanical experiment 〈H, ψ,On〉 has a small
Kolmogorovian representation. From Proposition 3 it then follows that it
also has a large conditional Kolmogorovian representation. Thus:
Theorem 2. All quantum mechanical experiments have large conditional and
small Kolmogorovian representations.
That is to say, quantum probabilities, as conditional probabilities in a large
space or as absolute probabilities in small spaces, are always Kolmogoro-
vian. This claim can be taken as a version of what Szabó (1995) calls the
Kolmogorovian Censorship.
The only difference between large conditional and small Kolmogorovian
representations is the extra data of coefficients {cα}α∈I required for building
a large space from the collection of small ones. This data determine the
probabilities of the measurement settings. In what follows we shall focus on
small representations that do not have this excess structure.
The rest of the paper is restricted to the discussion of the Bell–Aspect
experiment.
3 Small Kolmogorovian representation of the
Bell–Aspect experiment
Now we construct a small Kolmogorovian representation of the Bell–Aspect
experiment. Consider four non-empty sets a1, a2, b3, b4 representing measure-
ment settings on the left (a-settings) and on the right (b-settings), and sub-
sets A+i , A
−
i ⊆ ai, B+j , B−j ⊆ bj to be thought of as measurement outcomes of
ai and bj, respectively. We shall use the convention i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {3, 4},
and m,n ∈ {−,+}. We assume that these sets satisfy the following:
a1 ∩ a2 = b3 ∩ b4 = ∅
ai ∩ bj 6= ∅
a1 ∪ a2 = b3 ∪ b4
A−i ∪ A+i = ai, B−j ∪B+j = bj
A−i ∩ A+i = ∅, B−j ∩B+j = ∅
for i = 1, 2; j = 3, 4
(6)
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These set-theoretical requirements express conditions deriving from the phys-
ical meaning of the events in question; e.g. that in each run of the experiment
a setting on the left and a setting on the right is to be selected, or that Ami
cannot occur together with Amj if i 6= j. Out of these sets we build now four
Kolmogorovian probability spaces, labeled by pairs 〈i, j〉, in which quantum
mechanical probabilities will be represented. We exhibit below the probabil-
ity space 〈Ωij,Fij, pij〉:
Ωij = ai ∩ bj
Fij = {∅, A+i ∩B+j , A−i ∩B+j , A+i ∩B−j , A−i ∩B−j ,
A+i ∩ bj, A−i ∩ bj, ai ∩B+j , ai ∩B−j ,Ωij}
pij(A
m
i ∩ bj) = 〈ψ, Pmi ψ〉 pij(ai ∩Bnj ) =
〈
ψ, P nj ψ
〉
pij(A
m
i ∩Bnj ) =
〈
ψ, Pmi P
n
j ψ
〉
(7)
where Pmi and P nj are projections corresponding to outcomes Ami and Bnj ,
respectively, and ψ is the singlet state used in the Bell–Aspect experiment.
A particular arrangement of the measurement settings yields a probability
measure pij that corresponds to correlation vector (3).
Surface locality, according to which the probability of a measurement
outcome in one wing does not depend on the choice of a measurement setting
in the other wing, follows from the fact the measures pij represent quantum
probabilities in line with (7). Observe the shape of this condition in the small
space formalism:
pij(A
m
i ∩ bj) = pij′(Ami ∩ bj′) and pij(ai ∩Bnj ) = pi′j(ai′ ∩Bnj )
The condition relates different probability spaces, as it refers to probability
measures belonging to different spaces. In what follows we will come across
more constraints relating different small probability spaces.
4 Hidden variables: creation of new small
probability spaces
The four Kolmogorovian probability spaces we constructed above offer a
probabilistic representation of surface data: of measurement outcomes and
their probabilities. In the Bell–Aspect experiment these probabilities are
such that there are statistical correlations between the outcomes in the two
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wings. It is easy to read off from the numbers provided by correlation vector
(3) that
pij
(
(Ami ∩ bj) ∩
(
ai ∩Bnj
)) 6= pij (Ami ∩ bj) pij (ai ∩Bnj )
Assuming the spatial separation of the two wings, this correlation calls for a
common causal explanation. In the hidden variable terminology, a common
causal explanation translates to the requirement that the surface data, in-
cluding the correlations to be explained, emerge from a deeper level of hidden
states. We now produce small probability spaces that accommodate these
hidden states.
The new probability spaces should deliver probabilities of measurements
as marginal probability. In accord with the ideology of the common common
cause (Belnap and Szabó 1996), we thus consider a set Λ, interpreted as the
set of all hidden variables, one for all pairs of settings ai, bj. With Λ we
produce four product probability spaces 〈ΩijΛ,FijΛ, µijΛ〉, where7
ΩijΛ = {Ami ∩Bnj | m,n ∈ {−,+}} × Λ
FijΛ is generated by atoms {〈Ami ∩Bnj , λ〉}, where λ ∈ Λ
µijΛ satisfies
∑
λ∈Λ
µijλ(A
m
i ∩Bnj , λ) = pij(Ami ∩Bnj )
(8)
Observe that the new fields leave no room for some events from the fields
of the surface small probability representation, like ai ∩ bj =: Ωij or Ami ∩ bj.
However, there are in FijΛ ersatz objects for such events, as the following
“underline” notation explains:
{〈Ami ∩Bnj , λ〉 | λ ∈ Λ} =: Ami ∩Bnj ,Λ (9)
{〈Ami ∩Bnj , λ〉 | n ∈ {−,+}, λ ∈ Λ} =: Ami bj,Λ (10)
{〈Ami ∩Bnj , λ〉 | m ∈ {−,+}, λ ∈ Λ} =: aiBnj ,Λ (11)
{〈Ami ∩Bnj , λ〉 | m ∈ {−,+}, n ∈ {−,+}, λ ∈ Λ} =: aibj,Λ (12)
{〈Ami ∩Bnj , λ〉 | m ∈ {−,+}, n ∈ {−,+}} =: aibj, λ (13)
Since we need µ-probabilities conditional on λ to be well-defined, we
require that Λ be countable. Otherwise, we would have µijΛ(aibj, λ) = 0
7To avoid eye strain, below we do not write the angle brackets and curly brackets in
parentheses for a probability function.
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for every λ ∈ Λ,8 making conditional probabilities µijΛ(Ami ∩Bnj ,Λ | aibj, λ)
undefined.
The introduction of Λ leads to four new product probability spaces, that
could be seen as fine-graining of the initial probability spaces 〈Ωij,Fij, pij〉. A
large class of such product probability spaces fine-graining a given probability
space can be constructed, provided these product spaces are not constrained
by further conditions. Causal explanation of the results of the Bell–Aspect
experiment imposes, however, such conditions, to which we now turn. We
formulate them in the small-space approach.
Outcome Independence (OI) requires that the hidden variable should
screen-off the correlation of outcomes registered in separate wings of the
experiment. Thus, in the present formulation, it says:
µijΛ(A
m
i ∩Bnj ,Λ | aibj, λ) = µijΛ(Ami bj,Λ | aibj, λ)× µijΛ(aiBnj ,Λ | aibj, λ)
(OI)
Parameter Independence (PI) demands that an outcome in one wing of
the experiment should be statistically independent from a setting selected in
the other wing given that a hidden state is specified:
µijΛ(A
m
i bj,Λ | aibj, λ) = µij′Λ(Ami bj′ ,Λ | aibj′ , λ)
µijΛ(aiB
n
j ,Λ | aibj, λ) = µi′jΛ(ai′Bnj ,Λ | ai′bj, λ)
(PI)
Finally, No Conspiracy (NOCONS) postulates that pairs of settings be sta-
tistically independent from hidden states; in the present formalism, it reads:
µijΛ(aibj, λ) = µi′j′Λ(ai′bj′ , λ) (NOCONS)
(Each condition OI, PI, and NOCONS is universally quantified with respect
to i, i′ ∈ {1, 2}, j, j′ ∈ {3, 4}, m,n ∈ {−,+}, and λ ∈ Λ.) Note that in
contrast to OI, both PI and NOCONS relate probability measures belonging
to different product probability spaces.
To summarize what has been said we state the following definition.
Definition 5. A hidden-state small Kolmogorovian representation of the
Bell–Aspect experiment is a quadruple of product probability spaces
〈ΩijΛ,FijΛ, pijΛ〉 (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {3, 4}) of (8), with Λ countable and
Ami , B
n
j , ai, bj satisfying (6), and pij given by (7).
8See theorem 10.2 in Billingsley 1995.
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A small-space local common causal non-conspiratorial model of the
Bell–Aspect experiment is a hidden-state small Kolmogorovian representa-
tion of the Bell–Aspect experiment that satisfies the three conditions OI, PI,
and NOCONS.
It is no news that the combination of OI, PI, and NOCONS permits
a derivation of Bell’s inequalities. It will be instructive to see, however,
how this derivation goes through in a prudent framework of small product
probability spaces. This will lead us to ask what mathematical meaning the
combination of the three conditions has, and the answer we give will take us
back to Kolmogorovian representability in the original sense of Pitowsky–Fine
described in Definition 2.
5 The mathematical meaning of OI, PI, and
NOCONS
To examine the mathematical meaning of OI, PI, and NOCONS, it might
help to sketch a particular attitude to Bell’s theorem. The essence of this
attitude is a belief that working with small probability spaces, that is, by first
producing a surface small Kolmogorovian representation of the Bell–Aspect
experiment, and then fine-graining it to obtain a hidden-state small Kol-
mogorovian representation, one somehow blocks the derivation of Bell’s in-
equalities. To some extent, this belief is justified: there is a large class of
hidden-state small Kolmogorovian representations of the experiment which
do not imply Bell’s inequalities. But then, dramatically, once OI, PI, and
NOCONS are brought into play, the Bell’s inequalities become derivable. So,
what, mathematically speaking, do the three conditions do to a hidden-state
small Kolmogorovian representation? The theorem below offers an answer
to this query.
Theorem 3. Let 〈ΩijΛ,FijΛ, pijΛ〉 (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {3, 4}) be a hidden-state
Kolmogorovian representation of the Bell–Aspect experiment, delivering sur-
face probabilities pij. Assume that the spaces 〈ΩijΛ,FijΛ, pijΛ〉 satisfy OI, PI,
and NOCONS (i.e., they form a small-space model of Definition 5). Then
there is a Kolmogorovian probability space 〈Ω,F, P 〉 such that all the surface
probabilities pij are identifiable with absolute probabilities in 〈Ω,F, P 〉.9
9An analogous construction, but in a specific and little known framework of stochastic
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Proof. Let 〈ΩijΛ,FijΛ, pijΛ〉 (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {3, 4}) be as stated in the premise
of the theorem. Using an idea of Fine’s theorem, by applying the three condi-
tions OI, PI, and NOCONS, we will produce a Kolmogorovian product proba-
bility space 〈Ω,F , P 〉 that represents probabilities pij of the small probability
spaces as absolute probabilities. The essential part of the argument is that
the new probability space returns probabilities of joint and single outcomes,
which is a crux of Fine’s theorem.
The base set of our product space is:
Ω = {A−1 , A+1 } × {A−2 , A+2 } × {B−3 , B+3 } × {B−4 , B+4 }
its field of subsets F is generated by the following atoms:{〈Am1 , An2 , Br3, Bt4〉} , with m,n, r, t ∈ {+,−}
and the measure P is given by:
P (〈Am1 , An2 , Br3, Bt4〉) =∑
λ∈Λ
µ13Λ(a1b3, λ)× µ13Λ(Am1 b3,Λ | a1b3, λ)× µ13Λ(a1Br3,Λ | a1b3, λ)×
× µ24Λ(An2b4,Λ | a2b4, λ)× µ24Λ(a2Bt4,Λ | a2b4, λ)
(14)
We need to show the satisfaction of equations like
P ({〈Am1 , An2 , Br3, Bt4〉 | m, t ∈ {−,+}}) = p23(An2 ∩Br3)
We calculate only this case, observing how OI, PI, and NOCONS permit one
to change labels of small probability spaces. In the calculation we indicate
where these conditions are used (we leave other cases as an exercise for the
reader).
outcomes in branching spacetimes (SOBST) is carried out in Müller and Placek 2001.
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P ({〈Am1 , An2 , Br3, Bt4〉 | m, t ∈ {−,+}}) =∑
λ∈Λ
µ13Λ(a1b3, λ)× µ13Λ(a1b3,Λ | a1b3, λ)× µ13Λ(a1Br3,Λ | a1b3, λ)×
× µ24Λ(An2b4,Λ | a2b4, λ)× µ24Λ(a2b4,Λ | a2b4, λ) =∑
λ∈Λ
µ13Λ(a1b3, λ)×1×µ13Λ(a1Br3,Λ |a1b3, λ)×µ24Λ(An2b4,Λ |a2b4, λ)×1NOCONS=∑
λ∈Λ
µ23Λ(a2b3, λ)× µ13Λ(a1Br3,Λ | a1b3, λ)× µ24Λ(An2b4,Λ | a2b4, λ) 2xPI=∑
λ∈Λ
µ23Λ(a2b3, λ)× µ23Λ(a1Br3,Λ | a2b3, λ)× µ23Λ(An2b3,Λ | a2b3, λ) OI=∑
λ∈Λ
µ23Λ(a2b3, λ)× µ23Λ(An2 ∩Br3,Λ | a2b3, λ) =
µ23Λ(A
n
2 ∩Br3,Λ) = p23(An2 ∩Br3) = 〈ψ | P n2 P r3ψ〉
(15)
Finally, note that
P ({〈Am1 , An2 , B+3 , Bt4〉 | m, t ∈ {−,+}})
+ P ({〈Am1 , An2 , B−3 , Bt4〉 | m, t ∈ {−,+}}) =
P ({〈Am1 , An2 , Br3, Bt4〉 | m, r, t ∈ {−,+}}) = p23(An2 ∩ b3) = 〈ψ | P n2 ψ〉
(16)
and analogously,
P ({〈Am1 , An2 , Br3, Bt4〉 | m,n, t ∈ {−,+}}) = p23(a2 ∩Br3) = 〈ψ | P r3ψ〉 (17)
Since P is defined on atoms of F , it is additive by the definition. Equa-
tions (15)–(17) together with the definition of probability functions pij
(Eq. (7)) show that P is normalized to unity, i.e., P ({〈Am1 , An2 , Br3, Bt4〉 |
m,n, r, t ∈ {−,+}}) = 1. Thus, P is a probability measure, and 〈Ω,F , P 〉
is a Kolmogorovian probability space, such that all the surface probabilities
pij are identifiable with absolute probabilities in 〈Ω,F , P 〉.
The theorem thus shows that the three conditions OI, PI, NOCONS trans-
form a hidden-state small Kolmogorovian representation of the Bell–Aspect
experiment into a Kolmogorovian representation of this experiment (of Def-
inition 2): the set {〈Am1 , An2 , Br3, Bt4〉 | n, r, t ∈ {−,+}} corresponds to a
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single projector Pm1 present in the experiment, the set {〈Am1 , An2 , Br3, Bt4〉 |
n, t ∈ {−,+}} corresponds to a “double” projector Pm1 P r3 (and analogously
for other projectors involved). Thus, whereas from a metaphysical perspec-
tive, the three conditions embody a claim about a causal underpinning of
the Bell–Aspect experiment, their mathematical meaning is that they enforce
pasting together of the four probability spaces (of the hidden-state small Kol-
mogorovian representation) into one probability space, constituting a Kol-
mogorovian representation of the Bell–Aspect experiment. By Pitowsky’s
theorem, the existence of the latter representation implies Bell’s inequalities;
and, to repeat, these inequalities are violated by quantum mechanics and
most likely by Nature as well.
Given the mathematical meaning of the three conditions, one might want
to draw a moral which perhaps suggests a further research program (this is
a view of one co-author - TP, not shared by the other). Having seen what
the three conditions do to a hidden-variable small Kolmogorovian represen-
tation, one should modify them so that the modified version do not enforce
the pasting together of the small probability spaces. To please our causal
intuitions, the modified OI, PI, and NOCONS should bear some relations to
ideas underlying Reichenbach’s common cause principle, locality, and no con-
spiracy. Hofer-Szabó’s (2008) model with separate screener systems might
be perhaps seen as a case in point (for an examination of the model, and
some reservations towards it, see Wroński, Placek, and Godziszewski’s paper
in this volume). The mathematical meaning of the three conditions suggests
also a modest program of testing models for the Bell–Aspect experiment,
by asking whether the conditions of a given model imply the existence of
Kolmogorovian representation of this experiment, or not.
6 Conclusions
According to the Pitowsky–Fine approach the violation of Bell’s inequali-
ties is the expression of the fact that quantum probabilities are not Kol-
mogorovian probabilities. However, as we learn from Szabó (1995, 2001),
they should not be absolute Kolmogorovian probabilities in the first place:
by virtue of their meaning, quantum probabilities are conditional and they
reside in a large Kolmogorovian probability space that describes the mea-
surement events of a real-world experiment.
There is a sense however in which Szabó’s large space is not appropriate.
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Its construction essentially relies on an “excess structure” that does not seem
to be inherent to the quantum phenomena. This excess structure corresponds
to the probabilities of the different measurement settings that depends on
the experimenter’s decisions. We examined a simple method that factors
out this excess structure to arrive at a collection of small Kolmogorovian
probability spaces in which quantum probabilities are represented as absolute
probabilities.
The idea that correlations between events residing in these small prob-
ability spaces call for a common causal explanation motivates a search for
a hidden variable model of the experiment. We characterized such hidden
variable models in terms of the small probability space representation of
quantum probabilities. We showed that the existence of such a model allows
us to paste together the small probability spaces representing the quantum
probabilities in question into one single Kolmogorovian probability space that
constitutes a Kolmogorovian representation of those quantum probabilities
(in the original sense of Pitowsky–Fine).
In conclusion, one can phrase the duality of the two approaches to Bell’s
theorem this way: while the physical meaning of the violation of Bell’s in-
equalities is the impossibility of certain causal explanations of the quan-
tum phenomenon in question (respecting some physical/metaphysical princi-
ples about causation embodied by OI, PI, and NOCONS), the mathematical
meaning of these principles is that they produce a Kolmogorovian proba-
bility representation of the phenomenon, which cannot exist (by Pitowski’s
theorem and the violation of Bell’s inequalities).
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